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NOTES
JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION AGAINST CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The United States Constitution, and the organic laws of almost all
American states impose some limitation on the power of government
to punish for criminal offenses. 2 Most states have constitutional clauses
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishments and excessive fines which
are fashioned, like the eighth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution, 4 after the English Declaration of Rights.5  Some states, in
1. U.S. Const. amend. VIII: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
2. Only Connecticut and Vermont do not have an express prohibition in some
form prohibiting cruel punishment, but Connecticut does provide against imposi-
tion of excessive fines, Conn. Const. art. 1, § 13; and Vermont has said that the
common law at the establishment of the state is applicable, especially referring to
the English Declaration of Rights. See State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt. 97, 170 Atl. 98
(1934).
3. Thirty-six states have provisions of this type. See, e.g., Cal. Const. art. I, §
6; Mo. Const. art. I, § 21; N.Y. Const. art. I, § 5. Three states specifically direct
the prohibition to the courts. Md. Dec. Rights art. 25; Mass. Dec. Rights art. 26;
N.H. Const. art. I. § 33. The remainder of the states delineate the prohibition in
slightly varying terms. E.g., Pa. Const. art. I, § 13 (cruel punishments not to be
inflicted); Va. Const. art. I, § 9 (cruel and unusual punishments ought not to be
inflicted); Wyo. Const. art. I, § 14 (cruel or unusual punishment not to be in-
flicted).
4. The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution has been held to
apply exclusively to the exertion of national power and not to be a limitation on
the powers of the states. Pervear v. Massachusetts, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867) ;
Ex parte Garrison, 297 Fed. 509 (S.D. Cal. 1924); People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592,
112 N.E. 300 (1916) ; State v. Sharp, 156 La. 531, 100 So. 707 (1924). However
indications of an expanding conception of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to include certain of the Bill of Rights amendments has opened a way
for the Supreme Court to include the cruel and unusual punishment protection as
a part of fourteenth amendment due process. See Sutherland, Due Process and
Cruel Punishment, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 271 (1950); 34 Minn. L. Rev. 134 (1950). As
early as 1892, three justices of the Supreme Court thought the passage of the
fourteenth amendment had extended the applicability of the eighth amendment to
state actions. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 360, 370 (1892) (dissenting
opinions). More recently, in 1947, four dissenting justices felt that the prohibi-
tion was restrictive on state action through the due process clause. Louisiana ex
rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 472 (1947) (dissenting opinion). The
Court avoided a definite determination of the problem in 1949, when presented
with a Third Circuit determination that the eighth amendment right was "basic"
and "fundamental" to the rights of life and liberty and therefore the due process
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addition, have constitutional provisions that the "punishment shall be
proportioned to the character and degree of the offense.",, Although
sentenced defendants have frequently based pleas for mitigation upon
these limiting mandates, there are few instances in which an imposed
punishment has been nullified or diminished on such basis 7 This note
will examine the constitutional limitations which proscribe govern-
mental infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, and will assess the
reasons why the courts have been renitent against more actively ap-
plying them. Special consideration will be given to the question of
whether pyramiding cumulative penalties for multiple offenses may
be "cruel and unusual" when the aggregate punishment imposed seems
unduly severe in view of the offenses committed.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment finds its
origin in early English history, -  having been brought forward into the
Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution from the Magna
Carta' and the English Declaration of Rights of 1688.9 1 Its formal
embodiment was induced by a widely felt need for protection against
those modes of punishment, all too common in early days, which in-
flicted great pain and suffering on the prisoner., Physical torture was
the prohibited penalty, and because of this historical basis for the
prohibition it has seldom been considered apposite for application in
this country. Penalties imposed by our courts on convicted criminals
undoubtedly are more humane than the stake, the rack, or the thumb-
screw, which were commonplace in 1688. Therefore, when asked to
apply the protection, numerous courts have held that it applies only to
clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibited a state abridgment. Johnson v.
Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949). In a per curiam opinion the Court reversed be-
cause of a flaw in the defendant's procedure in bringing the case to the Court.
Johnson v. Dye, 338 U.S. 864 (1949).
1 W. & M'I., 2d Sess., ch. 2 (1688).
G. See, e.g., W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5. Illinois has no provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, but does have in its Bill of Rights a provision that
"all penalities shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense." Ill. Const. art
II, § 11.
7. Sutherland, Due Process and Cruel Punishment, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 271
(1950).
8. Fellman, The Defendant's Rights 203 (1958); 34 Minn. L. Rev. 134, 135(1950).
9. See ch. 14 of the Magna Carta, printed as confirmed by King Edward I in
1297, 4 Halsbury, Statutes of England 24 (2d ed. 1948).
10. 1 W. & Al., 2d Sess., oh. 2 (1688).
11. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) ; State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va.
66, 72, 69 S.E. 385, 389 (1910) ; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 472 (7th ed.
1903).
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the form of the punishment rather than to the quantity or duration;12
that "cruel" means inhuman or barbarous 3 and "unusual" means un-
known or fallen into disuse at the time of the adoption of the constitu-
tion,14 and that "cruel and unusual" punishment refers only to such
things as drawing and quartering, burning alive, starvation, mutila-
tion, or other "inhuman, barbarous or torturous punishment." These
courts would say that the cruel and unusual protection has no applica-
bility to a punishment which is in a conventionally permissible form,
even though severe because disproportionate to the offense.
However, the federal and some state courts do hold that the protec-
tion applies to the quantity or duration of the punishment, as well as
to the form, 5 and will apply the protection just as do the states whose
constitutions require that punishment be "proportional to the offense."
The leading federal case so holding is Weems v. United States" where
the defendant was convicted in a Philippine court (under United
States authority) for making false entries in public records regarding
payments of 616 pesos. He was sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor
in chains, a 4000 peso fine, deprivation of civil rights during imprison-
ment, and deprivation of political rights thereafter. The conviction
was reversed, the Supreme Court establishing the principle that pun-
ishment is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual which is not graduated
and proportional to the offense committed.17 This principle has been
subsequently interpreted and applied,18 but the indefiniteness inherent
12. E.g., Kistler v. State, 190 Ind. 149, 129 N.E. 625 (1921); People v. Morris,
80 Mich. 634,45 N.W. 591 (1890) ; Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 65 Pac. 169
(1901).
13. See cases supra note 11.
14. Cooley, op. cit. supra note 11, at 472; Puttkammer, Administration of Crim-
inal Law 231 (1953). Some forms of punishment may be unacceptable today even
though common when the Constitution was adopted. For example, when the Con-
stitution was adopted the sentence of death was carried out by means of hanging
or beheading. The latter would be improper today, even though a traditional pun-
ishment, because it has so completely disappeared from use as to be "unusual."
Puttkammer, op. cit. supra at 231. Yet the prohibition has not prevented the intro-
duction of new or different means to achieve an old end, the term "unusual" being
interpreted as an entirely different punishment. Therefore devices such as lethal
gas or electrocution, while unknown in 1789, have been approved as constitutional,
being merely new means to the achievement of the old and legitimate punishment
of death. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (electrocution); Hernandez v.
State, 43 Ariz. 424, 32 P.2d 18 (1934) (lethal gas); State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nov. 418,
211 Pac. 676 (1923) (lethal gas).
15. E.g., Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1947); Sustar v.
County Court, 101 Ore. 657, 201 Pae. 445 (1921).
16. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
17. Id. at 367.
18. See, eg., Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir. 1957) ("so greatly
disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shock-
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in the words "graduated" and "proportional" has left the courts free
to uphold many seemingly severe and disproportionate sentences.",
Another limitation on use of the cruel and unusual punishment pro-
tection has emerged as a result of the courts' conclusion that the
legislature has inherent discretion to decide what constitutes a crime
against the state and how such crime shall be punished, and that this
discretion is almost unlimited.2-° However, in spite of the courts'
hesitancy to question legislative determinations of the seriousness of
crimes and the severity of punishments, they have not renounced en-
tirely their constitutional responsibility to review actions of the legis-
lature in prescribing punishments for particular offenses. 21 This re-
sponsibility has been articulated in varying styles to express the basic
idea that there is some line over which the legislature cannot step in
making the punishment fit the crime. Thus, courts have said that they
will not interfere with the legislative determination unless the penalty
imposed is clearly cruel and unusual ;- that they will not review the
exercise of legislative discretion within constitutional limits ;23 or that
they are not authorized to invalidate a law unless it "unmistakably
and conclusively appears that it carries a punishment shockingly dis-
proportioned to the offense charged."2 -1 Regardless of the language
used it is apparent that these courts consider the legislature's preroga-
tive to be virtually illimitable so long as punishments do not exceed the
boundaries of reasonable propriety.25
ing to the sense of justice"); Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237 (6th
Cir. 1947) ("so disproportionate to the offense as to fall within the inhibition");
Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 64, 196 S.W.2d. 465, 469 (1946) ("so propor-
tioned to the offense committed that it shocks the moral sense of all reasonable
men as to what is right and proper under the circumstances").
19. See, e.g., Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946)
(imprisonment in jail for four years and fine of $5,000 for assault and battery);
State ex rel. Nelson v. Smith, 114 Neb. 653, 209 N.W. 328 (1926) (sixty days in
jail, two on bread and water, for possession of intoxicating liquor). In State v.
Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912), the sterilization of a prisoner guilty of
rape was upheld under a constitution prohibiting cruel punishments. But cf.
Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918), where a statute authorizing the
sterilization of certain criminals was held unconstitutional, the constitutional
clause stating that no cruel or unusual punishment shall be inflicted.
20. Territory v. Ketchum, 10 N.M. 718, 65 Pac. 169 (1901).
21. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378-79 (1910).
22. See, e.g., Moore v. Aderhold, 108 F.2d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Schultz v.
Zerbst, 73 F.2d 668, 670 (10th Cir. 1934); Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky.
704, 59 S.W.2d 983 (1933).
23. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Smith, 114 Neb. 653, 209 N.W. 328 (1926).
24. Kistler v. State, 190 Ind. 149, 158, 129 N.E. 625, 628 (1921).
25. Brown v. State, 152 Fla. 853, 13 So. 2d 458 (1943) ; Shields v. State, 149
Ind. 395, 49 N.E. 351 (1898) ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 416, 156 S.W.2d
469 (1941).
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A further limitation upon application of the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment prohibition has been the interpretation that its restraint
affects only the exercise of legislative discretion, and does not operate
against the judiciary. Once it is determined that a statute itself does
not violate the prohibition, then the penalty assessed by the trial
court or jury within the statutory limits ordinarily will not be ad-
judged excessive, even though seemingly disproportionate to the of-
fense committed.26 Thus, the legislature makes the broad policy deter-
mination of maximum and minimum penalties, leaving triers of par-
ticular cases at liberty to fix the punishment within the limits pre-
scribed. As long as the broad limits are observed, there is no constitu-
tional violation and the sentence is not reviewable on appeal.27 How-
ever, there are some decisions which have held that the cruel and
unusual provisions act not only as a restriction on legislative discre-
tion, but also on the judiciary, and that a sentence can be attacked even
if within the maximum limits of a valid statute. -8 The punishment
imposed by the trial court will particularly be subject to review when
the maximum penality is not fixed by statute but is left to the court.2 0
With the history of cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions as
protection principally against barbarous modes of punishment, with
judicial reluctance to set aside legislative determinations that a penalty
is proper for an offense, and with the further hesitancy to question
the discretion of trial courts to sentence within statutory limits, our
appellate courts have been similarly disinclined to invalidate cumula-
tive penalties when urged to do so on grounds of cruelty, unusualness
or disproportion. The problem of cumulative penalties is raised when
a defendant has been convicted in one trial for more than one offense,
which offenses usually arose out of the same criminal transaction or
course of conduct. The penalties for each offense are aggregated to
produce a heavier fine or a longer term of imprisonment than would
be permissible as punishment for a single conviction for a single
26. United States v. Sorcey, 151 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1945); Schultz v. Zerbst,
73 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1934); Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 59 A.2d 509 (1948).
27. Jackson v. United States, 72 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1934). But cf. Tincher v.
United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 664 (1926), where
the court indicated that sentences imposed within statutory limits could be re-
viewed on appeal "in case of gross or palpable abuse."
28. A sentence for embezzlement to five years in the penitentiary and a fine of
$577,000 was held to be a cruel and unusual punishment even though the sentence
was in accordance with the governing statute. State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 Pac.
596 (1909), modified on rehearing, 55 Ore. 474, 106 Pac. 1022 (1910). See also
Barber v. Gladden, 210 Ore. 46, 309 P.2d 192 (1957); Singletary v. Wilson, 191
S.C. 153, 3 S.E.2d 802 (1939).
29. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940); Singletary v.
Wilson, supra note 28.
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offense, " The case of O'Neil c. 1Vermo)t' clearly indicates the po-
tentially harsh results of such punishment. The defendant O'Neil con-
ducted a wholesale and retail liquor business in New York, taking
orders from Vermont customers and sending the liquor to them C.O.D.
by an express company. He was found guilty of 307 offenses of illegal
liquor sales committed over a three year period, and was fined $20
for each offense, or a total of $6140, and $500 in court costs. If the
fine and costs were not paid within twenty-four hours, he was to be
committed to jail for three days per each dollar, a total of over fifty-
four years. The Supreme Court of Vermont rejected the defendant's
arguments that the statute was a regulation of interstate commerce
and that the punishment imposed was unduly extreme and oppres-
sive. I-' The Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the writ of
error, holding that the record did not present a federal question and
that the question of excessive punishment raised by the defendant in
the state supreme court had not been properly raised on appeal. Mr.
Justice Field dissented, arguing that a federal question had been raised
so as to confer jurisdiction of the appeal, and hence the Court could
look to the whole record to correct any invasions of the defendant's
rights, including excessive punishment. And, while the eighth amend-
ment protection against cruel and unusual punishment was directed
only against United States authorities, such protection was also avail-
able against state action as a federal privilege and immunity since
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment33 He concluded that even
though the penalty for each offense was reasonable, the cumulative
punishment was cruel and unusual and grossly disproportionate to
the offenses committed, and was therefore unconstitutional and void.-
Field's argument against the validity of cumulative punishment,
30. 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 2214 (12th ed. 1957). Cumula-
tive penalties which are within the subject of this note should be distinguished
from cumulative punishment which is an increased punishment imposed for a
second or third conviction under habitual criminal statutes. As to this latter pun-
ishing device, it has been held that statutes imposing additional punishment on
persons previously convicted of crime do not violate prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912); lcDonaid
v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Beland v. United States, 128 F.2d 795
(5th Cir. 1942); State v. Dowden, 137 Iowa 573, 115 N.W. 211 (1908).
31. State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140, 2 Atl. 586 (1885), dismissed sub nom. O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
32. State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140, 2 Atl. 586 (1885).
33. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 362-63 (1892) (dissenting opinion). This,
of course, had been Mr. Justice Field's view of the fourteenth amendment privilege
and immunities clause since the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83
(1872). See discussion of this problem, supra note 4.
34. In a separate dissenting opinion Justices Harlan and Brewer essentially
agreed with l'4r. Justice Field. 144 U.S. at 366.
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when it is so greatly increased as to be entirely out of proportion to
the offenses committed, has not marshalled support among the courts
and such penalties have been upheld in spite of their seeming sever-
ity 35 There are several arguments and considerations to which the
courts have directed their attention when presented with the plea that
a particular cumulative punishment is unconstitutional. As in non-
cumulative cases where the cruel and unusual punishment protection
is sought, they have said the provision is directed against the character
of the punishment rather than the quantity or degree.', Also, the
courts have spoken of the cumulation of penalties as being primarily
a matter within the trial judge's discretion, stating that his determina-
tion within statutory limits should be upheld because of his intimate
knowledge and association with the facts and circumstances of the
case.37 It has been further said that it is the task of the legislature,
not the courts, to establish the rules of our society and to decide how
persons who break those rules shall be punished; and hence it is also
within the discretion of the legislature to determine the degree of
severity and whether or not penalties are to be cumulative.,, The
severity of a penalty which the legislature may properly impose de-
pends in a large part upon the object sought to be accomplished by its
imposition, and the courts have given wide latitude to the discretion
and judgment of the legislature to determine the penalty felt neces-
sary to accomplish that purpose.3 Thus, in State v. Lubee,40 the statute
provided a five dollar fine for each undersized lobster found in one's
possession, and the defendant was fined for each of thirty-six lobsters
so found. The court, in upholding this cumulative penalty, said the
purpose of the enactment and the importance of the public interest
sought to be protected must be considered when looking at the possible
excessiveness of the penalty. Here the legislature's policy to preserve
the fisheries as a food supply and source of employment warranted
such punishment as was authorized for the violations.
Of special importance with regard to legislative determination of a
proper penalty is the question of whether or not the threatened pun-
ishment will be a satisfactory deterrent against the commission of the
proscribed activity.' The courts have recognized and utilized the de-
35. See, e.g., People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592, 112 N.E. 300 (1916); Dobson v.
Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 214 Md. 654, 135 A.2d 890 (1957) (dictum).
36. State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 59 N.W. 1098 (1894). See supra notes 11-
19 and accompanying text.
37. See supra notes 26, 27 and accompanying text.
38. Lapinsli v. Copacino, 131 Conn. 119, 38 A.2d 592 (1944).
39. Id. at 132,38 A.2d at 598.
40. 93 Me. 418, 45 Atl. 520 (1899).
41. Puttkammer, Administration of Criminal Law 8 (1953). Compare discus-
sion that deterrence theory has fallen into disrepute in academic area but not
among legislators, 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 5 (12th ed. 1957).
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vice of cumulating penalties as a means of discouraging repeated or
multiple offenses where the penalty for each violation is relatively in-
significant. Since the penalties are increased according to the number
of the offenses, it is to the lawbreaker's disadvantage to begin and
continue his course of unlawful conduct.4 2 With crimes such as bur-
glary or robbery, the punishment for a single offense is considered
sufficiently severe to deter their commission, so that although a crini-
nal convicted of several separate offenses can be sentenced for each
offense, the sentences may be made to run concurrently.43 But for an
offense such as unlawful killing of wild game, a small fine would not
discourage the conduct if each animal unlawfully killed were not con-
sidered a separate offense, punishable as such, and the penalties were
not cumulated. For example, in State v. Poole,4 the defendant was
caught with 2,000 illegally obtained wild ducks. A fine of $50 or even
$200 would not be sufficient to discourage him from again seeking to
acquire as many birds as he could in order to gain the large profit
possible from their sale. But with a statute providing for a fine of
$10 to $25 or 10 to 30 days imprisonment for possession of each bird,
so that there might be imposed a $20,000 fine or, if not paid, an im-
prisonment of 200 days, the profit would be taken out of the unlawful
dealings and the prohibition made effective. 5 Moreover, by making
the possession of each wild duck a separate offense punishable with a
separate fine, the law retains enough flexibility to deal with both the
hunter who kills more than the legal limit and the commercial poacher
who hopes to profit from his unlawful conduct.
Even those courts which suggest that they would invalidate a sen-
tence which was excessive and disproportionate to the offense have in
fact continually determined that the cumulative sentence actually im-
posed was rot excessive. The standard against which they have meas-
ured the sentence or fine is not the total penalty but rather the penalty
for each individual offense46 If the penalty prescribed for each offense
is not constitutionally excessive, then the fact that more than one
offense was committed and the defendant was convicted and punished
42. See, e.g., Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34 (1902) ; State v. Craig,
80 Me. 85, 13 Atl. 129 (1888); State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 59 N.W. 1098
(1894).
43. Where more than one sentence is imposed under different counts they will
be presumed to run concurrently. See Annot., 70 A.L.R. 1511 (1931).
44. 93 Minn. 148, 100 N.W. 647 (1904).
45. Id. at 150, 100 N.W. at 647.
46. People v. Elliott, 272 11. 592, 112 N.E. 300 (1916). See also Manley v.
Fisher, 63 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1933) ; Scala v. United States, 54 F.2d 608 (7th Cir.
1931); Ex parte Brady, 70 Ark. 376, 68 S.W. 34 (1902); State v. Sharp, 156 La.
531, 100 So. 707 (1924); State v. Pohlabel, 40 N.J. Super. 416, 123 A.2d 391
(1956); State v. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140, 2 Atl. 586 (1885); Fletcher v. Commonwealth,
106 Va. 840, 56 S.E. 149 (1907).
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for each offense, with a severe total punishment, will not act to place
the defendant in a better position than if he had committed only one
offense.47 In Fletcher v. Commonwealth,48 where the defendant was
convicted of sixteen distinct liquor violations and fined $200 for each
offense, the court answered the argument that the penalty was exces-
sive by saying:
We are unable to say that $200 is an unreasonable and excessive
punishment for each of the offenses charged. The aggregate is
large because plaintiff in error was an habitual lawbreaker; and,
if the penalty imposed for each offense was proper, plaintiff in
error cannot be heard to complain of the aggregate which resulted
from his continued and flagrant criminal misconduct.4
An appeal based on the excessiveness of the punishment is under
the further handicap that the appellant has been tried and found guilty
as charged, and it is not the finding of guilt that is being attacked but
the sentence based on that finding. An appellate court may be asked to
review a cumulative punishment either because it is outside the statu-
tory limits or because it is excessive, even though within the statutory
limits50 It is generally conceded today that the court can correct the
sentence under the former circumstance,"' although the earlier view
was that the court could only reverse the conviction and remand for
a new trial.52 The alternatives open to the appellate court in the latter
situation are either to (1) affirm the sentence because it is within the
limits of the statute, (2) modify it to what the court considers rea-
sonable, or (3) reverse and remand for resentencing because the pun-
ishment assessed is unconstitutionally severe and cannot be sustained
by the appellate court regardless of the certainty of the defendant's
guilt and the fact the penalty comes within the statutory limits. But
in the absence of a specific statutory authorization, an appellate court
itself will not reduce a sentence which is within the statutory limits,"
nor is it inclined to reverse a valid and proper conviction because the
penalty is improper. Therefore the court is most likely to sustain the
conviction, even though it feels that the penalty was unnecessarily
severe.54
The courts have declared cumulative penalties unconstitutional in
only two instances, neither of which essentially involved cruel and
47. See, e.g., State v. Sharp, supra note 46; State v. O'Neil, supra note 46.
48. 106 Va. 840, 56 S.E. 149 (1907).
49. Id. at 848, 56 S.E. at 151.
50. Orfield, Criminal Appeals in America 101 (1939).
51. 5 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 2215 (12th ed. 1957).
52. Orfield, op. cit. supra note 50, at 101.
53. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604-06 (2d Cir. 1952); Comment,
36 Mich. L. Rev. 106 (1937). See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., People v. Elliott, 272 Ill. 592, 112 N.E. 300 (1916).
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unusual punishment or excessive fines provisions. In a railroad rate
regulation case,55 the Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional to
provide for fines against a railroad in such large amounts through
cumulative penalties so as to discourage resort to the courts to test the
validity of an imposed rate regulation. This is more a matter of equal
protection and of due process than of cruel and unusual punishment."
In the other case, 7 the defendants violated a city ordinance forbidding
the destruction of plants in public parks. They were accused and con-
victed of seventy-tvo distinct violations within a period of one hour
and forty minutes. The statutory punishment for each offense was a
ten dollar fine or, in default, thirty days imprisonment. Defendants
were fined $720, or six years in jail. The Supreme Court of Louisiana
discharged the defendants, holding that the cumulative punishment
was severe and unusual and therefore violative of the constitution.
However, the court appears to have been concerned essentially with the
distinction between the criminal conduct being one continuous act and
it being seventy-two distinct offenses, and felt that the conduct here
could not be split up into a multiplicity of offenses to avoid the limita-
tions on the punishing power of a court of limited jurisdiction. The
case is thus not one reversing a cumulative penalty but one in which
the statutory limits of punishment were exceeded.58
The conclusion to be reached after surveying the cases in which
severity of punishment prohibitions have been invoked is that there
has been a reluctance on the part of the appellate courts to review a
decree of punishment once imposed, and to reverse a conviction on the
basis of that review. This reluctance, and the fact that so few penal-
ties have in fact been struck down as constitutionally invalid, actually
reflect the humane moderation of American punishment. Gone are the
days of physical brutality and torturous punishment which initially
were the motivating factors for cruel and unusual punishment provi-
sions. Today the defendant urging the invalidity of a "cruel and un-
usual" punishment is arguing that the punishment is disproportionate
to the offense committed. But the courts have refused to determine that
this punishment is not just for this crime, reasoning that this determi-
nation is strictly a matter for the political branch of the government,
the legislature. This is rightly so, for it is the legislature that deter-
mines what constitutes a crime and it must be the legislature that de-
termines how unlawful action will be punished. It should be noted that
55. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
56. Id. at 147-48. See also Edwards & Browne Coal Co. v. City of Sioux City,
213 Iowa 1027, 240 N.W. '711 (1932).
57. State v. Whitaker, 48 La. Ann. 527, 19 So. 457 (1896).
58. This interpretation of the Whitaker decision is expressed in In re Schwartz,
119 La. 290,44 So. 20 (1907).
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practically all cases in which the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment or excessive fines is raised because of cumulative penalties,
involve fines rather than imprisonment. From this fact it can be in-
ferred that the legislature has not seen fit to provide cumulative penal-
ties of imprisonment, and even where there is statutory authority,
there are few instances when the trial courts have thought it necessary
to make sentences consecutive rather than concurrent, although they
have been willing to cumulate fines. Yet, however little the protection
against severity of punishment might be successfully invoked by de-
fendants, it stands always as a potential shield against arbitrary gov-
ernmental action and as a warning that in extreme cases appellate
courts can interfere.
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